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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 09-1476
            
DENNIS SADDLER, 
                                      Appellant
v.
ELLIOTT COMPANY
          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 07-cv-01320)
District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti
         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 14, 2009
Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN and  WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 21, 2009 )
            
OPINION
         
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant1
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Our jurisdiction to review the District Court’s
final order arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Dennis Saddler (“Saddler”) appeals from the District Court’s order
granting summary judgment for Elliott Company (“Elliott”), his former employer, on his
claim for benefits allegedly due under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (“ERISA”) (as amended), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  Saddler asserts that he is
entitled to severance pay pursuant to the Elliott Company Severance Plan (the “Plan”). 
We will affirm.1
I.
As the parties submitted a Joint Statement of Facts for purposes of their cross-
motions for summary judgment, the relevant facts are not in dispute.  Saddler is a
participant in the Plan which is administered under ERISA.  Saddler worked at Elliott as a
project engineer for thirty-two years, the latter part of his tenure in Elliott’s Plant Air
Packaging Group (the “PAP Group”).  In early September 2003, Elliott entered into an
Asset Purchase Agreement to sell the assets of the PAP Group to another entity, F.S.
Elliott Company (“F.S. Elliott”). 
Before the sale was complete, Elliott managers held meetings with employees of
the PAP group who would be “transferred” to F.S. Elliott to tell them “that they were not
being laid off.”  App. at 45.  Saddler was transferred to F.S. Elliott, where he had the
 Also, the District Court found Elliott’s interpretation of the2
phrase “plant closing” to be “inconsistent with [its] conduct under
the Plan,” because Elliott had provided severance pay to the PAP
Group employees who were not transferred from Elliott to F.S.
Elliott.  App. at 12.  The District Court reasoned that, since there
was no evidence of a decline in business or a technology
improvement when it occurred, Elliott treated the transfer of the
PAP Group as a plant closure.  We need not decide that issue
because we find another disposition.
3
same job responsibilities, and worked for the same or better salary, out of the same
building, at the same desk, and with the same telephone number.  Five months after the
transfer, Saddler resigned from F.S. Elliott. 
Then, in September 2006, more than two years after he resigned and nearly three
years after the transfer, Saddler sought severance pay from Elliott.  Elliott’s written
Severance Pay Policy allows payment at Elliott’s discretion to employees who lose their
job under three circumstances:  (1) a decline in business; (2) plant closing; or (3) a
technology improvement.  Elliott denied Saddler’s claim for severance pay.  Two months
later, Saddler appealed Elliott’s denial of his request for severance pay, arguing that his
job at Elliott “was eliminated due to the plant closure/sale” to F.S. Elliott.  App. at 48. 
Elliott denied Saddler’s appeal, finding that Saddler did not lose his job and that the PAP
Group never closed. 
The District Court concluded that Elliott’s interpretation of the phrase “job loss”
under the Plan was not arbitrary and capricious as it applied to Saddler.   The District2
Court so found after taking into consideration Elliott’s inherent financial interest in
4denying Saddler severance pay.  It accordingly granted summary judgment for Elliott and
denied Saddler’s motion for summary judgment.  We exercise plenary review over the
District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment.  
II.
As we explained in Doroshow v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company,
574 F.3d 230, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2009), the Supreme Court recently clarified the appropriate
standard trial courts must apply when reviewing denials of benefits under ERISA §
1132(a)(1)(B).  See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008).  If the
administrator of a benefits plan has discretion to determine eligibility for benefits, as
Elliott did here, the denial of benefits is to be reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious
standard.  Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).  We have
held that an arbitrary and capricious standard of review in this context is “essentially the
same as the ‘abuse of discretion’ standard.”  Abnathya v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d
40, 45 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal citation omitted).  However, reviewing courts must
weigh as a factor the inherent conflict of interest presented when the same party pays
benefits and determines eligibility.  See Glenn, 128 S. Ct. at 2350.  The District Court
correctly applied these standards when it reviewed Elliott’s denial of Saddler’s claim for
severance pay.
In analyzing the merits of Saddler’s request for severance pay, the District Court
first determined that the term “job loss” is ambiguous under the terms of the Plan because
it could be interpreted reasonably in two ways.  Nonetheless, the Court held the Plan did
not compel Elliott to follow the interpretation most favorable to the employee because
such an interpretation would eviscerate the administrator’s discretion, in contravention of
Glenn.  Thus, as Glenn mandates, the District Court weighed the conflict of interest as a
factor, and reasoned that Elliott did not abuse its discretion in finding that Saddler
suffered no job loss.  We agree.  
Elliott managers told Saddler that he was not being laid off before the transfer
from Elliott to F.S. Elliott.  Saddler missed no work after the transfer.  On the contrary, he
sat at the same desk with the same job responsibilities, telephone number, same or better
salary, and became unemployed only when he voluntarily resigned from F.S. Elliott.  In
light of those stipulated facts, Elliott did not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner in
concluding that Saddler did not suffer a job loss.  
Moreover, the District Court searched the record and found that “there are no facts
of record – other than the potential conflict itself – that any potential conflict of interest
influenced Elliott’s decision . . . .”  App. at 14.  Such analysis accords with Glenn.  See
128 S. Ct. at 2351 (holding that trial courts must give a conflict of interest greater weight
when “circumstances suggest a higher likelihood that it affected the benefits decision. . .
.”).
III.
For the above-stated reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting
Elliott’s motion for summary judgment.
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